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The nexus between social leisure and life satisfaction is riddled with endogeneity problems. In 
investigating the causal relationship going from the first to the second variable we start from 
considering  that retirement is an event  after which the time investable in (the outside job) 
relational life increases. We instrument social leisure with the probability of retirement of the three 
and four years younger cohorts. With such approach we document that social leisure has a positive 
and significant effect on life satisfaction. Our findings shed some light on the age-happiness pattern. 
Policy implications are also discussed. 
 
Keywords: life satisfaction, relational goods, social capital. 
JEL Numbers: I 30, D61 A11, A13. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Anyone who cannot belong to a community, or has no need to do so in view of his self-sufficiency is 




The number of papers investigating the determinants of life satisfaction published in economic 
journals has been dramatically growing in the last decade (see Clark et al. 2008 and  Frey 2008). In 
fact in recent years psychologists and  economists and other social scientists began to agree that 
subjective well-being can be measured with reliability and validity, using relatively simple self-
rating questions about “happiness” and “life satisfaction”( see Helliwell 2006 and Krueger 2008).  
                                                 
1 Politics, I, 2, 1253a 28-30.   2
A key motivation for the use of subjective well-being data in economics has been the desire 
to study the welfare implications of non-traded goods. The Life Satisfaction Approach (Frey et al. 
2004) can in fact be seen as an alternative to the traditional methods of measurement based on 
contingent valuation or revealed preferences. 
Subjective assessments of well-being have been used to estimate the shadow value of a wide 
range of environmental and social conditions, such as air quality and pollution (Welsch, 2002 and 
2006), airport noise (Van Praag and Baarsma, 2005), terrorism (Frey et. al., 2007), the fear of crime 
(Moore and Shepherd 2006), marriage (Johnson and Wu 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald 2004; 
Frey and Stutzer 2002a, 2002b and 2006) and unemployment (Clark and Oswald 1994; Gallie and 
Russell 1998; Di Tella et al. 2001 and 2003). 
An important class of non traded goods is represented by non instrumental social 
relationships or “relational goods”, as they are often defined in the literature: relational goods are 
the outcome of social activities such as interactions with friends, participation in the life of clubs, 
religious bodies, political parties, unions and civic and cultural organizations etc.  
Many studies in psychology support the conclusion that social relationships are essential to 
well-being: we refer the interested reader to the comprehensive overview in Diener and Seligman 
(2004). However in standard economic models individuals maximize the utility they derive from 
consumption of market goods and non-work time, while the choice between solitary and ‘relational’ 
leisure is left in the background. As we will see in more detail in the next section, both choices are 
obviously influenced not only by the price system but by the social environment and can be affected 
by a wide range of policies. In particular we shall see how due to coordination failure and /or to 
bounded rationality, consumption of relational goods may be inefficiently low at the individual 
level and even that society as a whole may get stuck in a Pareto-dominated equilibrium, which may 
be called a “social poverty trap”.  
If economic indicators do not correlate well with the quality of social relationships a key 
contribution to well-being is omitted in standard analyses of policies. The happiness data offer us a   3
way to quantify such an omission, and thus open a way towards a better evaluation of the equivalent 
variations of policies. 
The Life Satisfaction Approach  has been used to evaluate social relationships by Helliwell 
and Putnam (2004), Bartolini et al. (2009), Aslam and Corrado (2007), Becchetti et al. (2008), 
Bruni and Stanca (2008), Meier and Stutzer (2008) and Powdthavee (2008) among others. All these 
works confirm the findings by psychologists that relational goods are positively associated with 
SWB. However association does not imply causation: an important question still open in this 
literature is whether the direction of causality goes from social relationships to well-being as the 
idea that high well-being leads to more and better relationships is also plausible.
2 
The problem of biunivocal causality and endogeneity is pervasive in economics but 
particularly severe in the field of happiness. Beyond age (but not longevity!) almost all other 
variables introduced as regressors in life satisfaction equations may both cause and be caused by 
life satisfaction. For instance, the significant relationship between money and happiness may also 
be determined by unobserved individual traits (optimism, a well balanced personality etc.) which 
positively affect both subjective well being (SWB) and professional success. 
A first important opportunity of reducing the endogeneity problem is offered by the 
availability of panel data. We exploit this possibility by conducting our analysis using the German 
Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) which contains both cross-sectional and longitudinal information 
(from 1984 to 2007) on many variables, including self declared happiness and indicators of 
relational life, for a large sample of individuals.
3  
In fact, fixed effect estimation makes it possible to control for the confounding role of 
personality differences by which optimists will always say they are happy with their life: in many 
                                                 
2Interestingly Bartolini et al. (2009) working on US cross-sectional data (US General Social Survey) find that 
intrinsically motivated group membership (‘Putnam group’ memberships) is positively associated with well-being, 
while for membership in ‘Olson’ groups , i.e. instrumentally motivated, the opposite is true.  
3  The GSOEP is a longitudinal household survey sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and organized by 
the German Institute for Economic Research (Berlin) and the Center for Demography and Economics of Aging 
(Syracuse University). We are grateful to these institutes and to he project director Dr. G. Wagner for making this data 
set available.   4
instances a self-fulfilling expectation. In studying personal relationships it is quite obvious that a 
cheerful nature, whether due to genes or to upbringing, will make one’s social life easier and more 
rewarding: it is therefore doubly important in this case to control for permanent psychological traits 
by using panel data: Becchetti et. al (2008) and Powdthavee (2008), show that the link between 
happiness and social life survives the elimination of this fixed component by using respectively 
German and British panel data.  
However even when using panel data techniques the problem remains that time variations in 
SWB for the same individual may affect potential happiness determinants.  
This time varying dimension of the endogeneity problem is particularly severe when we 
consider the relational goods - well being nexus. Just by introspection, it seems quite obvious that 
not only personality, but also more transient feelings affect our propensity to meet people.  
To deal with this form of reverse causality, which cannot be taken care of by fixed effects 
estimation, we have to find a proper instrument, i.e. a variable which is exogenous but that is 
correlated with the endogenous regressor, in the absence of natural experiments.
4  
Our instrumentation strategy hinges on retirement. Retirement may be conceived as a 
permanent change in the individual organization of time. The fall in hours worked (not necessarily 
leading to zero worked hours since many retired individuals keep some informal working activities) 
corresponds to a large increase in leisure, potentially investable in social activities. However, even 
if it possesses important properties for the solution of the problem, retirement cannot instrument as 
such the relational goods indicator we use because the timing of retirement may be a choice 
influenced by one’s wellbeing. In Germany the mandatory age for retirement is 65 but the law 
creates a wide window of opportunities for retirement decisions around this age. Moreover we find 
that retirement belongs to the equation as a regressor, as it can have a direct positive effect on SWB, 
through for instance the ceasing or diminishing disutility of work. 
                                                 
4 Meier and Stutzer (2008), who concentrate on volunteering, tackle the causality problem by using the collapse of the 
East Germany volunteering infrastructure.   5
We want a factor, correlated with the time spent in social life, which cannot be suspected of 
endogeneity at the individual level. We find such a variable in the ratio between those who are 
retired and those who are not, among people three and four years younger than the individual.
5 This 
ratio may be regarded as the probability of being retired at a certain age based on the sample 
distribution of retirement decisions.  
Summing up, we create value added in the happiness literature by improved identification of 
the causal effect of social leisure on life satisfaction.  
Our results emphasize that relational consequences of economic policies need to be carefully 
taken into account when pursuing the goal of maximising social welfare. The advice stemming from 
our paper is that measures aimed at stimulating social life and at preventing negative side-effects on 
it of policies are of crucial importance.  
The paper is divided into five sections (including introduction and conclusions). The second 
section reviews some theoretical analyses on relational goods. The third and the fourth present and 
comment our descriptive and econometric findings. The fifth section concludes. 
 
2. Relational goods: an overview of the theoretical background  
 
The concept of “relational goods” was introduced by Gui (1987) and Uhlaner (1989) to define a set 
of intangibles from companionship, sympathy and intimacy, to feeling part of a community with 
same values or tastes etc. Bardsley and Sugden (2006) borrows from Adam Smith’s Theory of 
Moral Sentiments the term “fellow-feelings”, to describe the mental states produced during such 
non instrumental social interactions. The production process of these goods is the meeting - 
“encounter” in Gui (2005)’s definition - with family and friends or with a wider net of partners, i.e. 
                                                 
5 It would be possible to calculate this probability for the entire German population. Given the large size of our sample 
we argue that the sample statistic conveniently approximates that of the entire population and retains as well the 
characteristics of not being influenced by the observed individual retirement decision. To be more precise, strictly 
speaking, the individual retirement observation obviously contributes to the sample average but, given the large number 
of observations, its contribution is negligible.   6
many kinds of social events (association gatherings, cultural or sport events, etc.). Participating in a 
political debate, volunteering, applauding at a theatre are examples of relational goods produced on 
this larger scale. 
A defining feature of relational goods is that their value crucially depends on the sincerity 
and genuineness of the people involved. This implies that they can be generated as a by product of 
some instrumental activity but not exchanged through the market or indeed produced by state, 
which of course implies they don’t have a price and that their value has instead to be estimated. Nor 
can the estimation be done just by looking at their opportunity cost in terms of labour income given 
up by choosing leisure. Indeed leisure includes many heterogeneous activities which can be 
relational, pseudo-relational (second life on the internet) or utterly non relational (hours spent alone 
on TV). Interestingly, life satisfaction has been found to be negatively correlated with TV viewing, 
directly in Frey et. al. (2007) and indirectly by reducing time spent in relational activities in Bruni 
and Stanca (2008). Frey et al. (2007) find this evidence difficult to reconcile with the theory of 
revealed preference, by which any observed choice is utility maximizing, and interpret the finding 
as suggesting that people do not always act rationally, but often just follow habits and impulses. 
Indeed Frey et al. (2006) argue that individuals are prone to mispredict utility, through 
underestimation of adaptation, distorted memories of past experiences, materialistic beliefs fostered 
by institutions (e.g. marketing) and that these cognitive limits lead to overconsume goods satisfying 
extrinsic needs (material goods beside basic necessities) and underconsume goods satisfying 
intrinsic needs, relational goods among them. Empirical evidence on this distorted choices is 
offered by these authors by studying commuting. On the other hand, evidence on the association 
between well-being and generosity (measured in experiments) is found in Konow and Earley 
(2008).  
A different explanation, by no means alternative to the “behavioral” one put forward by Frey 
et al. (2007) for the opposite signs of the correlation of happiness with solo and social leisure-time 
hinges on the fact that relational goods, by definition, are not an option freely available at the   7
individual level. An individual’s time use choices may be contingent on the time use choices of 
others, because the utility derived from leisure time often benefits from the presence of 
companionable others. Corneo (2005), Jenkins and Osberg (2003) Antoci et al. (2005) and Randon 
et al. (2008) develop models starting from this premise that one cannot have a social life 
unilaterally. Various types of external effects concerning relational goods can be distinguished: 
there are externalities in the formation of an agent’s social network as the probability of a successful 
match with a partner increases with the time the agent and the potential partners devote to 
searching, while a second type of externality concerns the efforts by the agent and the potential 
partners in cultivating their skills as partners. Finally there are externalities at the aggregate level: 
Merz and Osberg (2006) find that the proportion of leisure time devoted to social leisure is higher in 
Lander with more public holidays. The result is interpreted by arguing that it is easier and more 
rewarding to participate in an association in a social context characterized by a rich network of 
associative opportunities. 
Due to these multi-level net of externalities equilibria with low socializing may coexist with 
equilibria with high socializing for groups of individuals as well as for nations as a whole.
6  
The consumption of relational goods will affect labour supply decisions: when other persons 
increase their hours of paid work, the probability of a feasible and desirable leisure match falls, 
which decreases the personal utility of non-work time. The consequences of such strategic 
complementarities in the enjoyment of leisure are considered in Alesina et. al. (2005) and Burda et 
al. (2008) in analyzing the difference in hours worked between Europe and the US, which has 
emerged in the 1970’s and has been increasing since then. This difference might not be due to a 
difference in the tax system, as maintained by Prescott (2004), or in tastes as suggested by 
Blanchard (2006), instead history (e.g., the first oil shock) and institutions (labor-market 
regulations) might have simply led otherwise identical Americans and Europeans to coordinate on 
                                                 
6 Antoci et. al (2007) show how bounded individual rationality and externalities combine in producing social poverty 
traps.   8
different equilibria.
7 In the “US” equilibrium, individuals work a lot, consume a lot, and have little 
time for communal activities. In the “European” equilibrium, consumers work less and consume 
less, but enjoy more common leisure. The European equilibrium Pareto dominates the US outcome 
in which individuals “bowl alone,” as deplored by Putnam (2000)  
Indeed Alesina et al. (2005) find that happiness is higher in countries with lower working 
hours. We can add that for the European countries there is an upward-sloping trend in happiness 
and a downward sloping trend in hours worked while for the US there is no trend in happiness and a 
upward sloping trend in hours worked as shown by Wolfers and Stevenson (2008). 
Finally the theme of relational goods is at least implicitly present in the vast literature on 
social capital, which studies the impact of social ties on the productivity of traditional private 
goods.  
Higher social participation may bring about social capital accumulation as a by-product. For 
instance, trust (or empathy) may be reinforced and generalised through social interactions.
8  
This rhapsodic overview of the recent economic literature on relational goods is far from 
complete. However we hope it is enough to convince the reader that the empirical study of the 
hypothesis that less common leisure leads to lower lifetime utility, on which we report in the 
following sections, has vast implications for the study of contemporary society. 
 
3. Descriptive empirical findings 
 
The obvious problem in identifying a positive relationship from relational goods to life satisfaction 
is that the hypothesis of a reverse causality link is equally convincing. To solve the puzzle we 
                                                 
7 According to these authors one of the strongest pieces of evidence in favor of complementarities across leisure is that 
an overwhelming share of the population both in Europe and the US takes its two days of leisure during Saturday and 
Sunday. There would be huge benefits from staggering work so that different people take different days off during the 
week: this could reduce commuting time and would allow capital to be spread over more workers: the fact that this is 
not done suggest that the costs in terms of forgone welfare due to less coordinated leisure would be sizable as well. 
However the relevant complementarities could be across work, rather than leisure.  
8 We notice however that the econometric techniques we use are unable to capture these more universal benefits of 
relational goods.   9
should isolate factors which determine an exogenous shock in time used in social life. To this 
purpose we thought of an event which occurs in every worker’s life: retirement. At a descriptive 
level we find that: i) retirement (voluntary or involuntary) mainly occurs in the early 60s in our 
sample; ii) retirement (unsurprisingly!) causes a sharp reduction in working time; iii) a significant 
increase in time spent in social life occurs in the early 60s; iv) in that same age category we observe 
a rise in life and, even more, leisure satisfaction.  
More specifically, using GSOEP waves from 1984 to 2007,
9 we notice that the share of 
retired individuals by age jumps up at 60 (from 30 to 50 percent) and at 65 (from 80 to 93): see 
Figure 1. In fact most individuals in our sample retire between 60 and 65. If we restrict the analysis 
to the  subset of individuals retiring during the survey (4,580 observations) and look at the 
cumulative density function, we observe that 50 percent of the sample gets retired before 60, while 
45 percent of the sample gets retired between 60 and 63, as Figure 2 shows.  
Figure 3 shows that the retired work much less than the non retired of the same age (the 
average difference is 4.3 hours between 50 and 52, 4.9 between 56 and 58, while dropping to 2.4 
between 65 and 67), but in these cohorts there is a decline in hours worked even for the non retired.  
To start our analysis we first have to build a “Relational Time Index” (RTI). To this purpose 
we use five relevant variables available in the GSOEP. Individuals are asked about the intensity 
with which they: i) “attend social gatherings”; ii) “attend cultural events”; iii) “participate in 
sports”; iv) “perform volunteer work”; v) “attend church or religious events”. We combine answers 
to these questions in a variable which can take values from 3 to 0, depending on how much time is 
devoted to each particular activity (0=Never, 1=Less Frequently, 2=Every Month, 3=Every 
                                                 
9 The data used in this paper was extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz for Stata®. PanelWhiz 
(http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew 
and Hahn (2006) for details. The PanelWhiz generated DO file to retrieve the data used here is available from us upon 
request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are our own responsibility.   10
Week).
10 Our relational time index is simply an un-weighted average of the points given to the five 
questions by each respondent. 
Our choice is motivated by two main reasons: first, all the above mentioned activities 
produce relational goods of the kind described in the previous section, even if the degree of their 
productivity in creating or strengthening ties among participants may vary, i.e. our synthetic 
indicator goes beyond the information that each single component could provide. Second, our 
measure allows us to reduce the problem of missing data since none of the five variables above is 
surveyed along the 24 waves. In order to have a higher number of observations and cover more 
years we calculate the RTI index on the basis of non missing relational variables for each 
individual-year. 
By looking at the RTI indicator and at its individual components we find that the time spent 
in relational activities becomes significantly higher after retirement, controlling for socio 
demographic variables and time dummies in a fixed effect panel estimate. The result holds when we 
plot estimated age effects on attending sport events, time spent with friends in religious circles, in 
volunteering activities, in attending cultural events and social gatherings (Figure 4). 
Since most workers retire in their early sixties, we inspect the age-happiness pattern and find 
that the increase in life and leisure satisfaction is well visible in the first part of the 60s. Average life 
satisfaction as a function of age exhibits the U-shape found in many previous studies, summarised 
in Frijters and Beatton 2008: at 29 average life satisfaction is 7.13, it falls to a minimum of 6.76 at 
55, and rises up to 7.07 for the 65 years old respondents (see Figure 5). The difference between the 
three levels is significant at the 95 percent level. The U-shape in life satisfaction is paralleled by a 
similar, and more pronounced, U-shape in leisure satisfaction (see Figure 6). Average leisure 
                                                 
10 We use this scale since answers do not allow us to infer an exact per month or per week frequency when “less 
frequently” is the response. It is likely that the distance from “every month” to “every week” corresponds to a more than 
proportional increase in sociability than the distance between “less frequently” and “every month”. If that is the case, 
our unweighted average flattens high intensity responses and may be conceived as a sort of log transform of the true 
unobserved frequency of relational activity. A robustness check in which we impute the presumed actual (per month) 
frequencies on the basis of qualitative responses (and, more specifically, one every two months is equated to the “less 
frequently answer”) has been performed. Results are substantially unchanged and available from the authors upon 
request.   11
satisfaction is 6.42 at 29 years, drops to a minimum (6.24) at 34 and rises up to 8.05 at 67. There is 
a spike in the indicator between 59 and 63. During this period average leisure satisfaction is 
significantly higher each year vis-à-vis the previous one at 95 percent. 
Summing up: people experience a sharp change in their work/leisure ratio between their late 
50s and early 60s, i.e. around a threshold which roughly corresponds to retirement. In parallel, we 
find a significant rise in social life and life  and leisure satisfaction. 
 
4. Econometric findings 
 
Based on these descriptive findings we go on to test the relational goods-happiness nexus through 
the following steps: i) we start with a base specification ii) we add our relational index to this base 
specification; iii) we perform an IV estimate in which the relational index is instrumented; iv) we do 
robustness checks with various subsamples and modified models; v) we test for survivorship and 
entry bias. 
Our base specification includes the explanators typically found in happiness regressions: 
marital and employment status, education, health status, number of children, log of equivalised real 
household income, an East/West dummy, house ownership,
11 changes in employment and marital 
status. We also include time dummies and age categories.
12 Opinions on the inclusion of year 
dummies in these types of estimates are mixed. On the one side, it is observed that they capture 
aggregate shocks to macroeconomic performance, political events etc. whose influence can be 
important so that excluding them would cause serious omitted variable bias. On the other side, 
when fixed effects are included and age and age squared are entered as regressors, including years 
                                                 
11 For a detailed description of the variables see the Appendix, Table A1. 
12 Differently from two previous studies which investigate the age-happiness relationship on the same data (Frijters and 
Beaton 2008; Van Landeghem 2008), we do not restrict the analysis to West Germans, as Frijters and Beatton (2008) 
and do not work only on the balanced panel, as Van Landeghem (2008). In our opinion, the balanced panel sacrifices an 
incredible amount of precious information. Our main results are however supported also in these two specific 
subsamples. Results are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request. In subsection 4.2 we discuss some 
further advantages and disadvantages of using the unbalanced panel.   12
dummies would create perfect collinearity: this is why, following Clark (2007) we use age 
categories instead.
13 In fact, this choice is crucial for estimating the GSOEP data as regards the 
relationship between age and SWB: if year dummies are not included, as in Frijters and Beatton 
(2008) the U-shaped relationship found when using age categories disappears and SWB is 
monotonically decreasing in age. This is in our opinion due to the fact that the panel, even the 
unbalanced one, ages, so that a disproportionate number of observations on the young come from 
the first years. These were happy years for Germany, presumably because of the reunification, so 
that excluding years dummies from the regression biases the coefficient on age.
14       
In the first four columns of Table 1 we present the following specifications: i) the base 
equation; ii) the base equation plus the retirement variable; iii) the base equation plus the RTI 
variable; iv) the base equation plus the retirement and RTI variables. Since the RTI variable is 
present only in a limited number of waves the number of observations in columns 3 and 4 falls 
considerably.
15  
Our findings confirm the “almost stylised facts” of the happiness literature, from the positive 
and significant effect of household income and marriage status to the negative and significant effect 
of separation, unemployment and health status (Table 1, column 1).  
A distinctive element with respect to most papers in the literature is our use of equivalised 
household income computed following the OECD equivalence scale,
16 together with the number of 
children coefficient. This makes the children variable positive and significant. In this way we are 
able to disentangle two children effects: a negative one represented by the reduction of per capita 
                                                 
13 However, in the presence of missing observations on some variables, age categories end up being collinear with year 
dummies, which leads Stata to dropping many of the latter. 
14 For a different opinion, focused on entry and survivorship bias, see Frijters and Beatton (2008). 
15 The base equation (Table 1, column 1) limiting the number of observations coinciding with those of the RTI 
augmented estimate does not change significantly our findings. It is omitted for reasons of space and available upon 
request. 
16 Equivalised income is household income which is adjusted by using an equivalence scale to take into account the size 
and composition of the household. Here we used the “OECD equivalence scale”. This assigns a value of 1 to the first 
household member, of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each child. This scale (also called “Oxford scale”) was 
mentioned by OECD (1982) for possible use in “countries which have not established their own equivalence scale”. For 
this reason, this scale is sometimes labelled “(old) OECD scale”.   13
income within the household and a positive one represented by the psychological value of having 
them. 
Both the retirement and the relational goods variables are positive and significant when 
separately considered and when jointly introduced in the estimates (Table 1, columns 2-4). The 
rationale for the retirement effect is twofold. On the one side, consistently with the standard 
assumption in economics that leisure is a good, people will enjoy retirement as the disutility from 
work ceases. However another complementary explanation is that with retirement an increase in the 
quantity and quality of social life is possible, and as we have seen in the previous section does 
indeed take place. We notice that coefficients of the age cohorts from 59 to 61 are still positive and 
significant even when we include the RTI and retirement variables. We thought of two plausible 
arguments reconciling such findings with the hypothesis that what explains the surge in SWB at the 
age of retirement is indeed retirement: i) hours worked are reduced in this age category even for 
those still working, as emerges from Figure 3, so the disutility of work is reduced for them, even if 
to a lower degree  than for the retired; ii) if the consumption of relational goods increases even for 
those still working, one could argue that, when many in the peers of the non retired are retired, it is 
easier for all in this cohort to avoid the relational poverty trap. People are better off when their 
reference group starts to retire, whether or not they themselves retire
17 
 
4.1 Tackling the endogeneity problem: the IV estimates  
 
We observed that our estimates of the coefficient of the relational time indicator is significant and 
strongly positive, even when permanent personality traits are netted out by fixed effect estimation. 
This result will be found to be robust to different subsamples and estimation models (see section 
4.2). 
                                                 
17Of course it is not difficult to think of other ( concurrent )explanations: it is possible that those who retire later hold 
particularly psychologically rewarding jobs, or due to a relatively strong work ethics and competitive attitude take pride 
from working at a later age, etc. However we have not attempted to disentangle these various possible effects.   14
However the direction of causality could run from time-demeaned subjective well being to 
time-demeaned intensity of social contacts. Our attempt here is to deal with this two ways causation 
type of endogeneity. We estimate a within group instrumental variable (IV) regression: the results 
are presented in Table 1, column 5 – 6. 
As anticipated in the introduction, our identification strategy hinges on retirement. However 
we do not use retirement as an instrument because our analysis in the previous section strongly 
suggests that an exclusion restriction for retirement is not possible. The same holds for the 
population probability of being retired at the age of the individual, even if these two variables are 
too collinear to be both included in the regression.  
We adopt as our instrument the probability that people 3 to 4 years younger than the 
individual may retire. In fact the retirement age pattern of the sample seems to be a reasonably valid 
instrument since it is only indirectly associated with the individual satisfaction of life. At the same 
time, it is enough correlated to the individual level of RTI to be fairly relevant in predicting the 
endogenous regressor. 
Validity means lack of correlation of the instrumental variable with the structural equation 
error. In a just identified model as our own, it is impossible to test for this condition, whose 
plausibility has to come from intuition instead. We argue that it is plausible that the probability that 
people 3 to 4 years younger may retire does not affect directly the SWB of an individual as 1) this 
probability is not a choice variable for the individual and therefore cannot be related to the time-
varying psychological factors captured in the error of our structural equation 2) the peer effect on 
SWB linked to others’ retirement choices is presumably linked to the behavior of an individual’s 
reference group. One characteristic generally assumed in the literature as regards reference groups 
is common age. The reason why we introduce at least three years’ difference between the individual 
age and the age of the individuals in the sample from which the probability is calculated is therefore 
to reduce as much as possible the force of a possible peer effect. We cannot consider an even larger   15
difference in age, because that would create a problem of relevance, the requirement by which the 
instrument must account for a significant variation of the endogenous regressor.  
Our model is a just identified IV so our estimates of coefficients are median unbiased. 
However the estimated variance of two-stage least squares is generally biased downward in finite 
samples, which means that the significance levels usually claimed for tests based upon two-stage 
least squares— null hypotheses are too often rejected. Stock et al. (2002) stress that the definition of 
weak instruments depends on the purpose to which the instruments are put, combined with the 
researcher’s tolerance for departures from the usual standards of inference (i.e., bias, size of tests). 
This means that, even for a just identified model, a researcher can decide to define an instrument 
weak if, say, the usual nominal 5% TSLS t  test of the hypothesis on the significance of the 
coefficient of interest in the structural equation has size potentially exceeding 15%. In the case, 
which is our case of one instrument and a single troublesome explanator, Stock and Yogo (2005) 
report that the critical value of the classic F-statistic is 16.38 for their test of this hypothesis. 
In other words, if the upper bound on the tolerated distortion of the Wald test based on the 
TSLS estimator is 15% , so that the true size of the test can be at most 10%, then we reject at the 
5% level of confidence the null hypothesis of weak instrument if the F test statistic of the 
coefficient of the instrument in the reduced form equation exceeds 16.38. In our case this F-statistic 
is 15.11. However if we accept that the true size of the test can be at most 15%, the critical value 
drops to 8.96 and we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instrument.  
Given these results, we decide to perform the Anderson – Rubin (1949) test. The Anderson – 
Rubin (1949) statistic is a Wald test robust to the presence of weak instruments when the sample 
size is large, where the null hypothesis tested is that the coefficient of the endogenous regressor in 
the structural equation is equal to zero. Anderson – Rubin (1949) test rejects the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient of the RTI indicator is zero (F – statistics is 4.30).  
We finally compute the Davidson – MacKinnon (1993) test of exogeneity for a fixed-effect 
regression estimated via instrumental variables, where the null hypothesis states that an ordinary   16
least squares (OLS) estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates. Our F 
statistics is 3.45: this rejects the null of exogeneity with a p – value of 0.06. 
The results of this battery of tests seem to support our choice of using IV estimation so we 
conclude that increasing the consumption of relational goods does cause an increase in life 
satisfaction. The fixed effect IV coefficient is much higher than the fixed effect OLS coefficient, 
which might be due to the inference problems seen above, but actually our principal aim at this 
stage of research is not to quantify the shadow value of social leisure but rather to establish and sign 
a causal effect of social leasure on SWB, and our results are not inconsistent with the possibility 
that such effect exists and it is positive.  
Note that the significance of the 59-61 up to 55-57 age categories disappears (and no other 
age categories become significant) in the IV estimates, a finding not in contradiction with the 
hypothesis that the upward bump in happiness as a function of age during the early 60s may be 
determined by the retirement-increase in social leisure combo. 
 
 
4.2 Robustness in subsample splits  
 
Table 2 shows that our finding replicate in different subsamples (women, men, East and West 
Germans, occupationally disabled
18 and not, registered as unemployed and not). The retirement 
effect on life satisfaction is almost four times larger for males than for females, while the enjoyment 
of relational life is similar for the two sexes. This may be interpreted in the sense that job-induced 
relational poverty during their working years is much stronger for males, who work longer hours 
and have full time jobs more often than women. Being retired attracts a significant coefficient for 
both employed and disabled workers
19. In particular, among those who were registered as 
                                                 
18 Any person whose capacity for social and/or occupational integration is severely restricted by an impairment or 
reduction of their physical and/or mental capacity is eligible for the aid awarded by the social assistance.  
19 Besides old age pensions the German welfare system provides disability benefits to workers of all ages not able to 
carry on a regular employment. If this inability is complete they receive full old age benefits, the so called disability   17
unemployed, the retirement effect is much higher than for those who were not: it seems likely that 
this is due to the end of a condition carrying a social stigma, and indeed shown to be very 
detrimental to SWB in many studies. 
The RTI variable is always significant in the observed subsamples even when we introduce 
the retirement variable. When instrumented with the age-retirement pattern, it remains significant 
for the male, the employed and the not occupationally disabled subsamples.  
 
4.3 Robustness in estimation methods  
 
In this section we want to check whether the effect of relational goods on happiness remains 
significant in relevant subsamples if we modify the choices on how to include age, time and 
individual fixed effects. As described above (see section 4), the benchmark model is estimated with 
a fixed effect regression including time dummies and age categories. Analysing here the possible 
alternative specifications with their drawbacks and advantages allows us to better justify our 
estimation choices.  
The first choice to make was about how to introduce age in the regression: nearly all recent 
papers enter terms in age and age squared. Frijters and  Beatton (2008) show that in most of these 
studies the effect of the linear term in age is always negative, whilst that of age-squared is positive, 
indicating a U-shape. Although this seems to be a typical finding in happiness regressions, we 
prefer not to impose a rigid functional form on age. Following Clark (2007) and Van Landeghem 
(2008), we use dummies representing age-bounded categories. Each age category comprises 3 
                                                                                                                                                                  
pension (“Erwerbsunfähigkeitsrente”, EU). A person that can work only half of the time or less compared to a healthy 
person received two-thirds of old age benefits (“Berufsunfähigkeitsrente”, BU). In the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
German jurisdiction has interpreted the rules on disability very broadly, in particular the applicability of the first rule. 
Disability is the most important pathway to retirement for civil servants: 47% of those who retired in the year 1999 used 
disability retirement. Hence we may consider the disabled group as a hybrid set (of not fully- irregularly employed 
partially subsidized workers) which stands between full employment and straight unemployment. See Borsch-Supan 
and Wilke (2004).   18
years: 17-19, 20-22 . . . 77-79, and the omitted category is the age group containing individuals in 
their eighties. 
Another issue is whether to estimate a pooled cross-sectional or a fixed effects regression.  
In Table 3.a we present the pooled regression results where we compare the two possible 
ways to enter age. The relational time index is strongly significant and positive over all subsamples 
and it maintains almost the same coefficient regardless of the way age enters the regression, even 
when we introduce the retirement variable. On the contrary, the retirement variable has a positive 
effect when age is entered in a linear form and the opposite when we use age categories (negative 
impact). 
In Table 3.b we show the results with fixed effects estimation. We did not include time 
dummies because of the perfect multicollinearity that relates them to age in its quadratic form. The 
RTI variable maintains a strongly significant effect on life satisfaction. For all other regressors, here 
omitted for reasons of space, we confirm the standard results in the literature. However, both these 
models suffer from a possible omitted variable bias due to the exclusion of time dummies.  
 
4.5 Survivorship and entry bias  
 
In our analysis we use the entire SOEP dataset, including all the subsamples from A through H
20, 
waves 1 to 24. The dataset evolves over time because of new subsamples being introduced. In each 
subsample, new entrants are limited to households split (i.e., individuals who move out and form 
their own households), and to individuals who moved into an original household because of 
marriage or to new “born sample members”. On the other side, households may leave the survey for 
several reasons. If the panel attrition due to respondents moving abroad or dying can be ignored, the 
one due to survey related reasons is an issue. Kroh and Spieß (2008) provide evidence on the risk of 
                                                 
20 Subsample A: Individuals and Household Residents in West Germany (1984 – 2007), Subsample B: Foreigners in 
West Germany (1984 – 2007), Subsample C: Residents in East Germany (1990 – 2007), Subsample D: Immigrants 
(1995 – 2007), Subsample E: Refreshment (1998 – 2007), Subsample F: Innovation (2000 – 2007), Subsample G: 
Oversampling of High Income (2002 – 2007), Subsample H: Refreshment (2006 – 2007).   19
survey-related panel attrition in different groups of the original sample units (e.g., in different sub-
samples, age, educational, and income groups). 
Observing both the entire GSOEP and the single subsamples, the share of non responses is 
very high. Attrition in the panel generates two potential problems which could undermine our 
estimation of life satisfaction: survivorship bias and entry bias. By survivorship bias we mean the 
possibility that our findings could be the spurious result of a selection process by which the 
characteristics of those who survive in the questionnaire are heterogeneous with respect to those of 
exitors. If happier individuals have a higher probability of surviving across waves, the survivorship 
bias could be the driving force behind the relational good effect instrumented by the age-retirement 
pattern. In such a case we would in fact observe a spurious effect on the increased happiness of the 
elders. Note, however, that the early 60s bump and the decreasing part of the happiness-age 
relationship after 75 would be difficult to reconcile with the idea of happier survivors unless we 
were in presence of an abnormally high rate of exit at the 50/60 turnaround and a subsequent fall of 
this rate after 75.  
The possibility of entry bias affecting our results is considered by Frijters and Beatton 
(2008), who observe that individuals entering the survey declare very high life satisfaction values 
while, gradually over time, their responses tend to be more sincere and their life satisfaction 
evaluation tends to go down. In this case a significantly larger share of entries of over-60 
individuals could lead to doubt our findings of a positive link between retirement, social life and 
happiness.  
So we preliminarily check whether we have an abnormal exit rate around the 50/60 
turnaround. The data clearly show that this is not the case. On average exits amount to 2.2 percent 
of our observations and there is no significant change in the early sixties. In the same way we do not 
observe an abnormal share of entries concentrated in the same age cohort. 
We then test formally for the existence of survivorship bias. As suggested by Wooldridge 
(2002), we estimate the determinants of exit with a probit regression. The exit dummy for the   20
response to our dependent variable (life satisfaction) is regressed on the usual socio demographic 
controls, age categories and time dummies. We also introduce time invariant effects: following 
Mundlak (1978), we create time averages of all the socio demographic explanatory variables. In the 
second stage, we introduce in the baseline equation the predicted value of the probit equation. 
Given the lack of significance of the introduced variable, the null of no survivorship bias is not 
rejected. The same procedure applies to verify for the presence of entry bias on our dependent 





Common sense tells us that relational life plays an important role in life satisfaction. As human 
beings we are dramatically influenced by recognition, appreciation and acceptance by others.  
With the Meier and Stutzer (2008) exception, the empirical contributions investigating the 
relational goods-happiness nexus have not solved the endogeneity problem. If the links between life 
satisfaction and almost all its potential determinants could go both ways, this is all the more true for 
social life.  
In this paper we devise a new approach to tackle the endogeneity issue. We consider that the 
retirement event allows individuals to re-master their own agenda and to invest more time in social 
and relational activities. However retirement is partially endogenous so, we observe the age pattern 
behind retirement decisions and use it to create a valid instrument. Our findings document that 
relational goods have a significant effect on life satisfaction which is quite robust under different 
specifications and subsamples. 
Our paper may also shed some light on the U-shaped relationship between age and 
happiness, which has become one of the stylised facts in the happiness literature. In fact we find 
that the rising part of the parabola may be explained by the retirement/ increase in social leisure   21
effect. An indirect proof of that is given by the fact that when we restrict our sample to unemployed 
individuals or when we instrument with the exogenous retirement age pattern our relational good 
index, we do not observe the strong effect of the sixties on happiness.    22
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Share of the retired population by age in the 
GSOEP 24 wave sample 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative distribution function of 




Figure 3. Daily average worked hours for retired and non retired individuals in different age categories  
(working week, Saturdays and Sundays) 
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Figure 4. Predicted age effects on time spent in relational life events such as Social Gathering, Volunteering, 
Sport, Cultural events, Religion, after controlling for socio demographic variables (income, employment status, 
marital status, health) and time dummies in a fixed effect panel estimate. Range of variation on the vertical axis: 
(0=Never, 1=Less Frequently, 2=Every Month and 3=Every Week) 
 
 
Figure 5. Average Life Satisfaction levels by Age  
 
 
Figure 6. Average Leisure Satisfaction levels by Age  
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Table 1. The effect of relational goods on Life Satisfaction: GSOEP, 1984 – 2007 (fixed effects regression) 
Variables  Base  Base Retired  Base RTI 
Base 
Retired RTI  IV Base  IV Retired 
RTI     0.213***  0.213***  2.330**  2.002* 
     (0.011)  (0.011)  (1.012)  (1.057) 
Retired   0.133***   0.133***   0.095** 
   (0.019)   (0.024)   (0.038) 
lgERHInc  0.216*** 0.215*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.188*** 0.194*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) 
Unemp  -0.253*** -0.242*** -0.266*** -0.256*** -0.236*** -0.227*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) 
lossjob  -0.129*** -0.134*** -0.158*** -0.163*** -0.198*** -0.201*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) (0.035) 
Emp  0.089*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.131*** 0.138*** 0.150*** 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.021) 
Married  0.119*** 0.122*** 0.154*** 0.157*** 0.441*** 0.401*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028) (0.135) (0.140) 
getMar  0.256*** 0.254*** 0.232*** 0.230*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.042) (0.040) 
getSep  -0.320*** -0.320*** -0.307*** -0.308*** -0.267*** -0.263*** 
  (0.059) (0.059) (0.077) (0.077) (0.091) (0.089) 
Separated -0.113**  -0.111**  -0.060 -0.059  0.176  0.135 
  (0.048) (0.047) (0.061) (0.061) (0.150) (0.154) 
Divorced  0.079** 0.081** 0.103** 0.104** 0.373***  0.332** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.044) (0.044) (0.138) (0.142) 
getDiv -0.079*  -0.079*  -0.079  -0.079  -0.136*  -0.132* 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.059) (0.059) (0.071) (0.070) 
Widowed  -0.248*** -0.264*** -0.218*** -0.235*** -0.190*** -0.207*** 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.053) (0.053) (0.070) (0.069) 
childHH  0.032*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) 
nEdyear  0.016*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
Owner  0.069*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) 
HospStay  -0.194*** -0.193*** -0.190*** -0.190*** -0.132*** -0.141*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.033) (0.033) 
OccupDis  -0.283*** -0.294*** -0.259*** -0.270*** -0.217*** -0.234*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.038) (0.039) 
WestDT  0.294*** 0.294*** 0.251*** 0.252*** 0.169*  0.180** 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.064) (0.064) (0.086) (0.085) 
Age17_19  -0.217 -0.210 -0.008 -0.001    
  (0.200) (0.200) (0.255) (0.255)    
Age20_22 -0.332* -0.325* -0.114  -0.107  0.350  0.307 
  (0.192) (0.192) (0.245) (0.245) (0.317) (0.310) 
Age23_25  -0.299 -0.287 -0.116 -0.104 0.319  0.281 
  (0.183) (0.183) (0.234) (0.234) (0.302) (0.295) 
Age26_28  -0.282 -0.265 -0.085 -0.069 0.354  0.320 
  (0.174) (0.174) (0.222) (0.222) (0.289) (0.282) 
Age29_31  -0.228 -0.207 -0.037 -0.016 0.378  0.347 
  (0.165) (0.165) (0.211) (0.211) (0.277) (0.271)   25
Table 1. The effect of relational goods on Life Satisfaction: GSOEP, 1984 – 2007 (fixed effects regression) (follows) 
Age32_34  -0.218 -0.193 -0.031 -0.007 0.301  0.283 
  (0.156) (0.156) (0.200) (0.200) (0.253) (0.246) 
Age35_37  -0.191 -0.162 -0.038 -0.010 0.200  0.199 
  (0.148) (0.148) (0.189) (0.189) (0.229) (0.222) 
Age38_40  -0.169 -0.137 -0.012 0.020  0.148  0.162 
  (0.139) (0.139) (0.178) (0.178) (0.212) (0.205) 
Age41_43  -0.137 -0.100 -0.012 0.024  0.069  0.094 
  (0.130) (0.130) (0.167) (0.167) (0.199) (0.194) 
Age44_46  -0.122 -0.082 -0.009 0.030  0.046  0.077 
  (0.122) (0.122) (0.155) (0.155) (0.188) (0.183) 
Age47_49  -0.112 -0.067 -0.020 0.023  0.043  0.077 
  (0.113) (0.113) (0.144) (0.145) (0.175) (0.172) 
Age50_52  -0.093 -0.046 -0.004 0.042  0.007  0.048 
  (0.105) (0.105) (0.134) (0.134) (0.165) (0.163) 
Age53_55  -0.069 -0.020 -0.010 0.039  -0.010 0.037 
  (0.096) (0.096) (0.123) (0.123) (0.155) (0.155) 
Age56_58  0.040 0.089 0.067 0.114 0.021 0.072 
  (0.088) (0.088) (0.112) (0.112) (0.150) (0.153) 
Age59_61  0.186** 0.221***  0.232** 0.264***  0.112  0.165 
  (0.079) (0.079) (0.101) (0.102) (0.159) (0.163) 
Age62_64  0.321*** 0.325*** 0.348*** 0.351*** 0.157  0.200 
  (0.071) (0.071) (0.091) (0.091) (0.174) (0.177) 
Age65_67  0.407*** 0.390*** 0.428*** 0.410*** 0.136  0.176 
  (0.063) (0.063) (0.081) (0.081) (0.193) (0.195) 
Age68_70  0.371*** 0.352*** 0.378*** 0.359*** 0.068  0.110 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.072) (0.072) (0.194) (0.197) 
Age71_73  0.333*** 0.318*** 0.337*** 0.322*** 0.030  0.070 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.063) (0.063) (0.175) (0.178) 
Age74_76  0.268*** 0.257*** 0.291*** 0.280*** 0.009  0.044 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.055) (0.055) (0.150) (0.152) 
Age77_79  0.154*** 0.146*** 0.198*** 0.191*** 0.037  0.058 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.047) (0.047) (0.098) (0.099) 
Time  dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
year 1992  0.811*** 0.831*** 0.765*** 0.786*** 0.609*** 0.641*** 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.063) (0.063) (0.090) (0.092) 
Constant  5.061*** 4.994*** 4.654*** 4.589***    
  (0.121) (0.122) (0.155) (0.155)    
Observations  271280 271280 179458 179458 133525 133525 
Number of ID  36250  36250  35818  35818  23487  23487 
R-squared  0.040 0.040 0.041 0.042 -0.266  -0.180 
Test for IV regression             
F-first-excluded      17.69  15.11 
Anderson Rubin   F test     6.79       4.30 
  p-value 0.01      0.04 
Davidson Mac Kinnon  F test  5.63      3.45 
  p-value 0.017      0 .06 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, stars for significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Omitted age category: 
>79. IV estimates: RTI instrumented by the sample age-retirement pattern. The IV regressions drop Age17_19 because of 
collinearity. 
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Table 2. Robustness in subsample splits  
 Women  Men  East  West 
Not 
OccupDis  OccupDis Unemp 
Not 
Unemp 
Base Retired          
Retired 0.064**  0.249***  0.250***  0.111*** 0.113*** 0.291*** 0.271*** 0.077*** 
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.043) (0.022) (0.022) (0.048) (0.068) (0.021) 
Observations  140233 131047 54231  217049 241011 30269  25184  246096 
Number  of  ID  18548 17702 7611  29115 34720 6076  8778  35142 
R-squared 0.037  0.046  0.037  0.041 0.033 0.045 0.035 0.037 
          
B a s e   R T I           
RTI  0.224*** 0.205*** 0.197*** 0.212*** 0.176*** 0.378*** 0.189*** 0.215*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.012) (0.011) (0.042) (0.063) (0.011) 
Observations  92812 86646 37646 141812  160020  19438 17094 162364 
Number  of  ID  18337 17481 7546  28707 34155 5651  7859  34544 
R-squared 0.037  0.050  0.037  0.044 0.035 0.047 0.040 0.039 
          
B a s e   R e t i r e d   R T I           
Retired 0.038  0.290***  0.254***  0.111*** 0.125*** 0.274*** 0.300*** 0.079*** 
  (0.034) (0.037) (0.055) (0.028) (0.028) (0.063) (0.101) (0.027) 
RTI  0.224*** 0.204*** 0.195*** 0.212*** 0.176*** 0.372*** 0.188*** 0.215*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.012) (0.011) (0.042) (0.063) (0.011) 
Observations  92812 86646 37646 141812  160020  19438 17094 162364 
Number  of  ID  18337 17481 7546  28707 34155 5651  7859  34544 
R-squared 0.037  0.051  0.038  0.044 0.035 0.048 0.041 0.039 
          
I V   B a s e          
RTI 0.856  3.603**  9.804  1.374 2.518**  1.688 6.124 2.151** 
  (1.400) (1.487) (9.357) (0.944) (1.216) (1.749) (6.469) (1.030) 
Observations  69442 64083 32651 100682  116456  15315 10783 119279 
F-first-excluded 7.332  11.39  1.236 16.12 12.30 6.185 1.246 16.40 
Number  of  ID  12130 11357 5678  17948 21212 3269  3185  21984 
R-squared  0.008  -0.770 -4.763 -0.060 -0.357 -0.047 -1.453 -0.239 
          
I V   R e t i r e d             
RTI 0.778  2.889**  10.223  1.063 2.209*  1.537 1.953 2.115* 
 (1.540)  (1.444)  (11.349)  (0.999)  (1.267) (1.812) (4.524) (1.129) 
Retired 0.022  0.234***  -0.102  0.091** 0.073*  0.175  0.307***  0.012 
  (0.056) (0.058) (0.429) (0.039) (0.042) (0.114) (0.110) (0.048) 
Observations  69442 64083 32651 100682  116456  15315 10783 119279 
Number  of  ID  12130 11357 5678  17948 21212 3269  3185  21984 
R-squared  0.014  -0.465 -5.190 -0.014 -0.262 -0.026 -0.095 -0.229 
F-first-excluded 6.011  10.03  0.904 13.77 10.46 5.657 1.006 13.52 
Notes: Sub samples are  Male vs Female, West vs East Germans, Registered as unemployed vs not registered, reporting occupational 
disability vs not reporting. Robust standard errors in parentheses, stars for significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Omitted age category: >79. IV estimates: RTI instrumented by the age-retirement pattern. 
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Table 3.a. Robustness check in alternative models: pooled regression with quadratic age specification (1) or age 
categories (2). Same controls as in the benchmark model with time dummies. 
  A l l       N o t     N o t    
Pooled 1  sample  Women  Men  East  West   OccupDis OccupDis  Unemp   Unemp   
Retired  0.171*** 0.113*** 0.330*** 0.433*** 0.152*** 0.213*** 0.155*** 0.460*** 0.121***  
  (0.015) (0.020) (0.024) (0.035) (0.017) (0.017) (0.038) (0.057) (0.016)  
Age 
AgeSquare  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  271280 140233 131047 54231  217049 241011 30269  25184  246096  
P o o l e d   2             
Retired -0.031*  -0.075***  0.121***  0.108***  -0.022 0.013  0.045  0.406***  -0.088***   
  (0.017) (0.023) (0.028) (0.041) (0.019) (0.020) (0.039) (0.057) (0.018)  
Age Categories  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  271280 140233 131047 54231  217049 241011 30269  25184  246096  
P o o l e d   1             
RTI  0.429*** 0.462*** 0.400*** 0.458*** 0.419*** 0.388*** 0.708*** 0.443*** 0.423***  
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) (0.027) (0.031) (0.008)  
Age 
AgeSquare  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  179458  92812 86646 37646 141812  160020  19438 17094 162364   
P o o l e d   2             
RTI  0.414*** 0.450*** 0.384*** 0.438*** 0.405*** 0.377*** 0.678*** 0.435*** 0.411***  
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) (0.027) (0.031) (0.008)  
Age Categories  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  179458  92812 86646 37646 141812  160020  19438 17094 162364   
P o o l e d   1             
Retired  0.165*** 0.112*** 0.337*** 0.414*** 0.139*** 0.200*** 0.168*** 0.428*** 0.115***  
  (0.018) (0.024) (0.030) (0.042) (0.021) (0.020) (0.047) (0.069) (0.019)  
RTI  0.428*** 0.461*** 0.399*** 0.454*** 0.418*** 0.386*** 0.710*** 0.440*** 0.423***  
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) (0.027) (0.031) (0.008)  
Age 
AgeSquare  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  179458  92812 86646 37646 141812  160020  19438 17094 162364   
P o o l e d   2             
Retired -0.013  -0.050*  0.148***  0.139***  -0.015 0.018  0.078  0.373***  -0.067***   
  (0.021) (0.028) (0.034) (0.048) (0.024) (0.024) (0.048) (0.070) (0.022)  
RTI  0.414*** 0.449*** 0.385*** 0.439*** 0.405*** 0.377*** 0.679*** 0.433*** 0.411***  
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) (0.027) (0.031) (0.008)  
Age Categories  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  179458  92812 86646 37646 141812  160020  19438 17094 162364   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, stars for significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Omitted age category: >79. 
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Table 3.b. Robustness check in alternative models: fixed effect regression with quadratic age specification (1) or 
age categories (2). Same controls as in the benchmark model, no time dummies. 
  A l l       N o t     N o t  
  sample  Women  Men  East  West   OccupDis OccupDis  Unemp   Unemp 
F i x e d   E f f e c t   1            
Retired  0.250*** 0.168*** 0.381*** 0.410*** 0.218*** 0.231*** 0.355*** 0.273*** 0.201*** 
  (0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.040) (0.020) (0.020) (0.047) (0.067) (0.019) 
Age Age Squared  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  271280 140233 131047 54231  217049 241011 30269  25184  246096 
Number  of  ID  36250 18548 17702 7611  29115 34720 6076  8778  35142 
Fixed Effect 2           
Retired  0.117*** 0.045*  0.237*** 0.217*** 0.097*** 0.093*** 0.281*** 0.236*** 0.060*** 
  (0.019) (0.026) (0.029) (0.043) (0.022) (0.022) (0.048) (0.067) (0.021) 
Age Categories  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  271280 140233 131047 54231  217049 241011 30269  25184  246096 
Number  of  ID  36250 18548 17702 7611  29115 34720 6076  8778  35142 
Fixed Effect 1           
RTI  0.209*** 0.220*** 0.200*** 0.218*** 0.205*** 0.176*** 0.349*** 0.192*** 0.210*** 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011) (0.039) (0.057) (0.011) 
Age  AgeSquared  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 179458  92812 86646 37646 141812  160020  19438 17094 162364 
Number  of  ID  35818 18337 17481 7546  28707 34155 5651  7859  34544 
Fixed Effect 2           
RTI  0.202*** 0.214*** 0.192*** 0.198*** 0.200*** 0.171*** 0.338*** 0.191*** 0.204*** 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011) (0.039) (0.057) (0.011) 
Age  Categories  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 179458  92812 86646 37646 141812  160020  19438 17094 162364 
Number  of  ID  35818 18337 17481 7546  28707 34155 5651  7859  34544 
Fixed Effect 1           
Retired  0.253*** 0.148*** 0.425*** 0.424*** 0.218*** 0.250*** 0.340*** 0.306*** 0.206*** 
  (0.022) (0.031) (0.034) (0.051) (0.025) (0.025) (0.061) (0.099) (0.024) 
RTI  0.207*** 0.218*** 0.197*** 0.210*** 0.203*** 0.174*** 0.340*** 0.191*** 0.208*** 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011) (0.039) (0.057) (0.011) 
Age Age Squared  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 179458  92812 86646 37646 141812  160020  19438 17094 162364 
Number  of  ID  35818 18337 17481 7546  28707 34155 5651  7859  34544 
Fixed Effect 2           
Retired  0.120*** 0.021  0.283*** 0.222*** 0.101*** 0.107*** 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.066** 
  (0.024) (0.034) (0.037) (0.054) (0.028) (0.028) (0.063) (0.100) (0.026) 
RTI  0.202*** 0.214*** 0.192*** 0.196*** 0.200*** 0.171*** 0.333*** 0.191*** 0.204*** 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011) (0.039) (0.057) (0.011) 
Age  Categories  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 179458  92812 86646 37646 141812  160020  19438 17094 162364 
Number  of  ID  35818 18337 17481 7546  28707 34155 5651  7859  34544 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, stars for significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Omitted age category: >79 
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Table 4. The effect of relational goods on Life Satisfaction: GSOEP, 1984 – 2007 (ordered probit regression with 
Mundlak correction) 








        
lgERHInc  0.240*** 0.269*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.241*** 0.258*** 
    (32.39) (28.35) (27.45) (27.44) (34.80) (18.84) 
Unemp -0.347***  -0.345***  -0.350*** -0.347*** -0.344*** -0.230*** 
    (-22.66) (-17.98) (-18.48) (-18.12) (-21.91) (-8.95) 
lossjob -0.024  -0.013  -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 -0.010 
    (-1.34) (-0.57) (-0.48) (-0.51) (-0.85) (-0.30) 
Emp  0.087*** 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.101*** 0.085*** 
    (9.61) (7.55) (8.22) (8.19) (10.76)  (4.46) 
WestDT  0.168*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.140*** 0.034 
   (4.86)  (3.18) (3.19) (3.19) (3.91) (0.32) 
Married  0.128*** 0.133*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.101*** 0.215 
   (7.32)  (5.98) (6.99) (7.00) (5.77) (1.94) 
getMar  0.218*** 0.194*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.226*** 0.091 
    (11.08) (7.72)  (7.67)  (7.66)  (11.43) (1.48) 
Separated -0.137***  -0.161***  -0.141*** -0.140*** -0.170*** -0.158 
    (-4.10) (-3.84) (-3.35) (-3.34) (-5.05) (-1.28) 
getSep -0.182***  -0.121**  -0.121** -0.121** -0.177***  -0.108 
    (-4.80) (-2.50) (-2.49) (-2.50) (-4.64) (-1.36) 
Divorced  0.054**  0.039 0.062 0.062 0.016 0.071 
   (2.17)  (1.22) (1.95) (1.95) (0.63) (0.61) 
getDiv -0.067**  -0.051  -0.052 -0.052 -0.058 -0.042 
    (-2.17) (-1.26) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.87) (-0.54) 
Widowed -0.356***  -0.373***  -0.368*** -0.370*** -0.427*** -0.331*** 
    (-12.11) (-9.93)  (-9.80)  (-9.83)  (-14.56) (-2.90) 
Nkid  0.098*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.163*** 
    (17.91) (14.98) (15.07) (15.08) (20.06) (10.80) 
nEdYear 0.010***  0.008  0.009**  0.009**  0.007  -0.002 
    (2.99) (1.83) (2.08) (2.04) (2.03) (-0.18) 
Owner  0.087*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.073*** 0.089*** 
   (8.66)  (7.30) (7.26) (7.26) (7.19) (3.41) 
HospStay -0.135  -0.140***  -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.135*** -0.213*** 
    (-18.19) (-14.72) (-14.09) (-14.09) (-18.01) (-16.35) 
OccupDis -0.335***  -0.357***  -0.345*** -0.347*** -0.337*** -0.312*** 
    (-29.27) (-25.47) (-25.03) (-24.88) (-28.94) (-19.18) 
Retired   0.013   0.015  0.027  0.080*** 
     (0.77)   (0.87) (1.88) (4.36) 
f(RA)      0.255***  0.181** 
        (3.22)  (2.15) 
RTI    0.229***  0.229***      
      (30.95)  (30.95)      
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Table 4. The effect of relational goods on Life Satisfaction: GSOEP, 1984 – 2007 (ordered probit regression with 
Mundlak correction) (follows) 








Time dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Dummy for 1992  0.044 0.015 0.045 0.045 0.096 0.135 
   (2.75)  (0.92) (2.75) (2.74) (7.27) (5.44) 
Age  Categories  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Mundlak correction 
terms  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant        
Intercept term 1  -0.477  -0.516  -0.679  -0.664  0.032  0.196 
    (-5.28) (-5.17) (-7.03) (-6.77) (0.28)  (1.13) 
Intercept term 2  -0.155  -0.181  -0.343  -0.328  0.354  0.531 
    (-1.73) (-1.83) (-3.57) (-3.36) (3.07)  (3.07) 
Intercept  term  3  0.319 0.298 0.140 0.154 0.828 1.007 
   (3.56)  (3.02) (1.46) (1.59) (7.19) (5.84) 
Intercept  term  4  0.822 0.805 0.650 0.665 1.331 1.524 
    (9.18) (8.18) (6.82) (6.86) (11.57)  (8.84) 
Intercept  term  5  1.228 1.210 1.056 1.071 1.736 1.962 
    (13.71) (12.29) (11.08) (11.06) (15.09) (11.38) 
Intercept  term  6  2.040 2.026 1.875 1.890 2.545 2.880 
    (22.77) (20.57) (19.67) (19.50) (22.11) (16.70) 
Intercept  term  7  2.565 2.553 2.403 2.418 3.071 3.447 
    (28.63) (25.91) (25.19) (24.94) (26.67) (19.98) 
Intercept  term  8  3.402 3.393 3.244 3.259 3.909 4.285 
    (37.94) (34.39) (33.96) (33.57) (33.93) (24.81) 
Intercept  term  9  4.692 4.688 4.540 4.554 5.200 5.650 
    (52.19) (47.36) (47.37) (46.77) (45.05) (32.63) 
Intercept  term  10  5.595 5.596 5.447 5.462 6.103 6.516 
    (62.108)  (56.37) (56.66) (55.91) (52.80) (37.55) 
            
Observations  241938 155468 155473 155468 238590 75998 
Log  likelihood  -  407413.3  -265596  -265127.65 -265119.59 -401462.89   -126994.87 
Note: Z – statistics are in parenthesis, stars for significance levels : **<5%, ***<1%.  
Mundlak correction terms are the averages over time of the socio demographic variables. f(RA) is the age retirement 
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Appendix  
Table A1. Summary statistics and variable description 
Variable     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
LifeSat 
individual response to the question about overall life satisfaction on a scale from 0 (completely 
dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied) 
  overall  6.998687 1.843842 0 10  N =  359414
  between  1.497601 0 10  n =   45116
   within    1.298756 -2.155159 14.73782  T-bar = 7.96644
Age  age of respondent 
  overall  44.92886 17.27107 16 99  N =  360659
  between  18.11675 16.5 98.5  n =   45167
   within    4.501839 23.59553 73.72886  T-bar = 7.98501
lgERHInc 
logarithm of the real household income post government tax computed using the OECD equivalence scale 
which gives a value of 1 to the first household member, of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each 
child 
  overall  5.71935 0.7368481 -0.2812348 10.31859  N =  450670
  between  0.6779744 2.535179 9.872525  n =   56284
  within  0.3958774 0.5154164 8.936131  T-bar = 8.00707
Unemp  dummy for being registered as unemployed the previous year 
  overall  0.0663784 0.2489427 0 1  N =  353323
  between  0.1822691 0 1  n =   44888
  within  0.1955424 -0.8780661 1.024712  T-bar = 7.87121
lossjob  dummy for becoming unemployed during the previous year 
  overall  0.0316941 0.1751847 0 1  N =  301034
  between  0.1041184 0 1  n =   37869
  within  0.1599804 -0.6349726 0.9882158  T-bar = 7.94935
Emp 
dummy for employment status, which takes the value of 1 if the individual is full-time employed. The base 
category is composed by the remaining employment status options: regular part time employment, 
vocational training, marginal employed, near retirement or zero working hours, military service, 
community service, disabled employed, not employed. 
  overall  0.4346967 0.4957178 0 1  N =  360709
  between  0.4307905 0 1  n =   45180
  within  0.2879888 -0.5236367 1.39303  T-bar = 7.98382
WestDT  dummy for living in a Federal Land of the former West Germany 
  overall  0.7934599 0.404823 0 1  N =  521763
  between  0.3974125 0 1  n =   57832
  within  0.0676256 -0.1648735 1.737904  T-bar = 9.02205
Married  dummy for being married 
  overall  0.6253467 0.4840339 0 1  N =  360907
  between  0.4665301 0 1  n =   45167
  within    0.2137265 -0.3329866 1.58368  T-bar =  7.9905
getMar  dummy for becoming married 
  overall  0.0159117 0.125134 0 1  N =  310590
  between  0.0690619 0 1  n =   38498
  within    0.1171187 -0.4840883 0.9724334  T-bar = 8.06769
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Variable     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
Separated  dummy for being separated 
  overall  0.0155303 0.1236494 0 1  N =  360907
  between  0.0948185 0 1  n =   45167
  within    0.0991693 -0.8935606 0.9738637  T-bar =  7.9905
getSep  dummy for becoming separated 
  overall  0.0067066 0.0816188 0 1  N =  310590
  between  0.0474313 0 1  n =   38498
  within    0.0757366 -0.4932934 0.9632283  T-bar = 8.06769
Divorced  dummy for being divorced 
  overall  0.0632601 0.2434305 0 1  N =  360907
  between  0.2137163 0 1  n =   45167
  within    0.1224026 -0.8950733 1.021593  T-bar =  7.9905
getDiv  dummy for becoming divorced 
  overall  0.0062365 0.0787251 0 1  N =  310590
  between  0.0472064 0 1  n =   38498
  within    0.0732374 -0.4937635 0.9627583  T-bar = 8.06769
Widowed  dummy for being widoved 
  overall  0.0634568 0.2437831 0 1  N =  360907
  between  0.2347744 0 1  n =   45167
  within    0.0958456 -0.8948765 1.02179  T-bar =  7.9905
NKid  the number of children in the household 
  overall  0.9414802 1.143354 0 10  N =  474284
  between  1.053981 0 8.285714  n =   57832
  within    0.578876 -6.915663 6.864557  T-bar = 8.20107
nEdYear  years devoted to education 
  overall  11.47531 2.581218 7 18  N =  348398
  between  2.566649 7 18  n =   43253
   within    0.7195988 2.040526 20.04674  T-bar = 8.05489
Owner  dummy for being tenant or owner of the dwelling 
  overall  0.4565155 0.498106 0 1  N =  477515
  between  0.4607174 0 1  n =   57832
  within    0.2329825 -0.5018178 1.414849  T-bar = 8.25693
HospStay  a dummy for overnight stay in hospital during the previous year 
  overall  0.1185592 0.3232696 0 1  N =  330046
  between  0.2066107 0 1  n =   44525
  within    0.283803 -0.8147741 1.073105  T-bar =  7.4126
OccupDis  dummy for being unable to work or severely handicapped 
  overall  0.1118429 0.3151736 0 1  N =  297158
  between  0.270461 0 1  n =   41574
  within    0.1618354 -0.8355256 1.059211  T-bar = 7.14769
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Variable     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
RTI  Relational Time Index, values: 0 "Never" 1 "Less Frequent" 2 "Every Month" 3 "Every Week" 
  overall  1.001114 0.5912067 0 3  N =  228163
  between  0.5140423 0 3  n =   41578
  within  0.3546132 -1.158261 3.201114  T-bar = 5.48759
Age17_19  dummies for age group : 3 years 
 overall  0.0501915 0.2183401 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.2470165 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.1554439 -0.7498085 1.008525  T-bar = 7.98501
Age20_22 overall  0.0505796 0.219138 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1708795 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.1813263 -0.7494204 1.008913  T-bar = 7.98501
Age23_25 overall  0.051514 0.2210441 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1598536 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.1891186 -0.748486 1.009847  T-bar = 7.98501
Age26_28 overall  0.053308 0.2246472 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.147811 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.1960994 -0.696692 1.011641  T-bar = 7.98501
Age29_31 overall  0.055845 0.2296225 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1466251 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.2026881 -0.694155 1.014178  T-bar = 7.98501
Age32_34 overall  0.058773 0.2351996 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1479322 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.2086298 -0.691227 1.017106  T-bar = 7.98501
Age35_37 overall  0.0614098 0.2400808 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1507323 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.2129521 -0.7385902 1.019743  T-bar = 7.98501
Age38_40 overall  0.0612739 0.2398325 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1500635 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.2127596 -0.6887261 1.019607  T-bar = 7.98501
Age41_43 overall  0.0596852 0.236903 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1496233 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.2097725 -0.7403148 1.018019  T-bar = 7.98501
Age44_46 overall  0.0575863 0.2329597 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1487377 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.2061942 -0.6924137 1.01592  T-bar = 7.98501
Age47_49 overall  0.0547581 0.2275078 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1419028 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.2012445 -0.6952419 1.013091  T-bar = 7.98501
Age50_52 overall  0.0516333 0.2212858 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1412822 0 1  n  =  45167
 within  0.1952639 -0.6983667 1.009967  7.98501
Age53_55 overall  0.0479844 0.2137335 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1353563 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.1886515 -0.7020156 1.006318  T-bar = 7.98501  38
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Variable     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
Age56_58 overall  0.0454252 0.2082351 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1293696 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.1843189 -0.7045748 1.003759  T-bar = 7.98501
    
Age59_61 overall  0.0436063 0.2042178 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1331331 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.179259 -0.7063937 1.00194  T-bar = 7.98501
    
Age62_64 overall  0.0417846 0.2000969 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1274496 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.1751416 -0.7082154 1.000118  T-bar = 7.98501
    
Age65_67 overall  0.0372429 0.1893568 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1217941 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.164972 -0.7127571 0.9955763  T-bar = 7.98501
    
Age68_70 overall  0.0301809 0.1710849 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1119404 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.14869 -0.7198191 0.9885142  T-bar = 7.98501
    
Age71_73 overall  0.024849 0.1556649 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.1059698 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.1339598 -0.725151 0.9831823  T-bar = 7.98501
    
Age74_76 overall  0.0202463 0.1408418 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.0994959 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.1201694 -0.7297537 0.9785796  T-bar = 7.98501
    
Age77_79 overall  0.0159264 0.125191 0 1  N  =  360659
 between  0.0932999 0 1  n  =  45167
  within  0.1056717 -0.7340736 0.9742597  T-bar = 7.98501
Note: N is the total number of observations; n is the total number of individuals; T is the number of waves. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 